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I Introduction 
The objective of this article is to analyze some current conflicts between patents and competition. 
Analyzing the tensions between these two instruments have been the subject of a large body of the 
economic literature and, after a long academic debate, patents and market competition are now  
considered by most economists as offering complementary rather than substitutable incentives in 
favour of innovation.4  Two statements summarize the current economic beliefs concerning the 
relationships between patents and competition: on the one hand, firms innovate to escape from 
competition (Darwinian view); on the other hand, the social benefits of innovation cannot be 
captured without the spur of competition and the scrutiny of antitrust law (mainstream view). 
However, despite this favorable convergence, some important tensions persist between the 
Intellectual Property and the antitrust authorities. One of the main arguments developed in this 
chapter is that these tensions mainly occur because the current patent system presents some 
dysfunctions that create distortions difficult to solve under the antitrust rulings. Besides the 
traditional conflict between the dynamic efficiency and the static deadweight loss, the contemporary 
dysfunctions of the patent system can be made easier to understand by recalling how the economic 
representation of patents has evolved.  
In its initial and most common representation, a patent protects a discrete innovation, in other words 
an isolated innovation specific to a technology, without links to any downward or upward 
technology. It confers on its holder the temporary power to stop a third party from using the 
protected information that is disclosed in the patent without the holder’s consent. A large proportion 
of the initial literature on patents uses the discrete innovation framework and reaches the 
unsurprising conclusion that a stronger patent protection promotes innovation.  To obtain this result, 
the literature implicitly makes a number of assumptions.5 In particular, it assumes that a patent is an 
intellectual property asset satisfying the following properties: i) it confers a perfect protection to its 
holder: once granted it is presumed to be an unquestionable right. Moreover, it perfectly defines the 
protected claims that are disclosed in the patent. In other words, even though it is an intellectual 
property right, a patent is treated as any other iron-clad property right; ii) a patent is supposed to be 
the best instrument of protection because, unlike the trade secrecy, it allows the holder to collect 
damages when an infringement is detected; and iii) a patent delivers an autonomous and 
independent piece of information about knowledge, in the sense that the innovation it protects is 
not linked to other innovations, neither upstream nor downstream. In other words, there is a clear 
and unique connection between a technology and a patent. All these implicit assumptions were 
instrumental in the development of a huge economic literature, focused on one hand on the socially 
optimal design of the patent in terms of duration and scope of protection, and on the other hand on 
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the links between innovation and competition (Gilbert 2006). The progressive challenge to these 
different assumptions contributed to the analysis of new concerns raised by the development of the 
patent system.  
 
The challenge to the first assumption led to a careful (re)examination of the consequences of a 
rather uncertain protection by the patent. The uncertainty has been exacerbated in recent years by 
abusive award of patents to applications that do not fully satisfy the patentability criteria, notably 
that of the required inventiveness (or non-obviousness in the American language). Awarding patent 
rights to dubious applications is thus the first dysfunction of the patent system. It considerably 
affects competition in the product market. Patents that are dubious or too broad (i.e. incorporating 
claims with an excessive scope) harm the equilibrium between intellectual property and competition 
by discouraging the monitoring of innovation and by artificially increasing final prices due to 
unwarranted royalties. In its 2003 report6, the Federal Trade Commission concluded that increasing 
the quality of awarded patents should be a top priority to re-establish the equilibrium between 
intellectual property and competition. When uncertain patents covering valuable products exist, it is 
no longer true that a stronger protection promotes innovation. Moreover, an uncertain protection 
undermines the intrinsic superiority of the patent over other forms of protection, suggesting that if 
the number of patent applications is maintained at a very high level, it is because a patent has a 
different function than simply insuring protection against imitation.   
  
 A second characteristic of the patent system is the fact that patents are increasingly used as 
instruments in technology exchanges. It is illustrated by the importance of the open innovation 
organization and the frequent use of patent trading between various agents.7  Assumption iii/ in the 
traditional representation of the patent is now replaced by a cumulative conception of the 
innovation process. The view that technological change is not an isolated event but a sequential 
process in which each innovation is built on knowledge patented by forerunners has two 
consequences.  First, the patent’s function is not only to protect the holder from a malicious imitator 
(backward protection), but also to block a follow-up innovation (forward protection). Second, while 
the discrete view emphasized competition in the product markets, the cumulative view focuses on 
competition on the markets of technological exchanges. Technological competition in these markets 
may be affected by hold-up behaviour. For example, a patent holder can accuse a producer of patent 
infringement, by pretending that the patent covers some of the technologies that he is using for his 
production. This accusation can be especially detrimental to the producer when it is made ex post, 
i.e. after the second innovator completed the investment necessary for his activity. A further 
escalation is reached when the patent holder sues for infringement not on a delivered patent, but on 
a patent pending not yet published.  Indeed, the laws on divisional patent applications or on 
continuation patent applications authorize an initial depositor to act as if the date of the new 
application ran from the date of the initial application. In some situations, the potential infringer 
could have acted while ignoring the existence of a divisional patent application, which would explain 
why he did not request an authorized license from the holder before starting production of its own 
good. Finally, when a license royalty is required ex post by the patent holder, its level can be 
excessive compared to the level that would have been required if the negotiation had happened ex 
ante (i.e. before the producer started production of its good). The hold-up situation is made worse 
when the patent holder requests that the potential infringer stops his activity by obtaining a relief 
injunction. The threat of injunction that weighs on the downstream innovator clearly gives an 
advantage to the upstream innovator. Are such threats legal from the point of view of intellectual 
property law? Some believe so, arguing that an injunction is the normal consequence of the 
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protection awarded to a patent holder. Others believe that injunctions should not be authorized, 
arguing that these practices constitute serious obstacles to the continuous operation of markets.8 
 
Finally, a third and more contemporary dimension of the patent system further complicates the 
question of the tensions between patents and competition. In the cumulative conception of 
innovation, some patents act not only in a sequential manner as assumed in the previous paragraph, 
but also in clusters: it is the case when the use of numerous independent patents is necessary to 
produce a single good.9 Not only does this clustering increase the transaction costs due to the so-
called patent thicket, but it may also create an obstacle to further innovation. It is now the fight for 
the market, and not on the market, that matters. Patent races are essential instruments in this 
competition. In opposition to the free entry assumptions used in most of the endogenous growth 
models, patent races are governed by imperfect competition. The accumulated patents strongly 
influence the structure of the races, thus having an effect on the competitive mechanisms on the 
innovation markets. The massive sales of patent portfolios that are observed illustrate the important 
role of these intellectual property instruments for the conquest of new markets.  Two factors 
contribute to the appearance of this phenomenon: the conjunction of a high fragmentation of 
intellectual property rights, and the development of a great number of complex technologies that 
require many patented elementary components. Many sectors of the ICT industries (Information and 
Communication Technology) produce goods that require the use of a great number of patented 
components. Even if each component represents only a minor part of the value of the final good, it 
still may be an essential input. In part because the coordinated price of a collective license can be 
inferior to the sum of the prices of the independent licences, economic efficiency requires that 
complementary patents be coordinated through a patent pool or through a Standard Setting 
Organization (SSO) tasked with the choice of a technological standard. However, as in any process in 
which complementarities between independent inputs require a coordinated behaviour, individual 
deviations from the collectively defined norms are frequent.  For example, it may happen that during 
an SSO’s deliberation, an agent certifies that he has no intellectual property relevant to the standard. 
Thus, the chosen standard may be based on this certification. But after the standard adoption, the 
same agent allegedly demands royalties from those using its technology in connection with that 
standard. This type of deviation, illustrating once again hold-up behaviour, can have significant 
impacts in terms of competition, especially in the innovation market. The coordination process can 
also cause other different problems. For example, the determination of the essential patents can 
lead to conflicts when substitutable technologies are in presence. Moreover, agreeing on the 
economic principles that a collective license price must satisfy is not an easy task.  Finally, the risk of 
collusive behaviour is never absent. Indeed, it is difficult for antitrust authorities to mitigate this risk.  
 
The paper is organized around the three aforementioned dysfunctional aspects that affect the 
competition process respectively in the product markets, the technology markets and the innovation 
markets: the issue of bad quality patents (II), the hold-up behaviour in follow-up innovation (III), and 
the coordination issue in patent pools and technological standards (IV).   
    
II.   Patents Quality and Competition in the Product Markets  
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It is commonly recognized that the number of patent applications is very large and increasing, as 
illustrated by the following figure for the United States: “Every Tuesday, the day of the week the US 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issues new patents, there are roughly 3,500 new patents, 
corresponding to new IP rights that no American is allowed to infringe, and for which there is no fair 
use defence to patent infringement like with copyright and trademark” (Lei and Wright, 2010). This 
figure reflects the sign of a very dynamic and innovative economy as the U.S. but one cannot 
disregard the possibility that many of these patents may be of bad quality, in the sense that they fail 
to satisfy at least one of the patentability criteria: utility, novelty, and non-obviousness (inventivity).  
The US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and to a lesser extent the European Patent Office 
(EPO), are trapped in an uncomfortable position defined as follows by Lemley (2012): “The Patent 
and Trademark Office finds itself caught in a vise. On the one hand, it has been issuing a large 
number of dubious patents over the past twenty years, particularly in the software and electronic 
commerce space. It issues many more patents than its counterparts in Europe and Japan10; roughly 
three‐fourths of applicants ultimately get one or more patents, a higher percentage than in other 
countries. Complaints about those bad patents are legion, and indeed when they make it to litigation 
they are quite often held invalid. Even the ones that turn out to be valid are often impossible to 
understand; in the information technology industries, there is no lawsuit filed in which the parties 
don’t fight over the meaning of patent claim terms."11  
It is now largely admitted that a patent is not an ironclad right as are other forms of property. A 
patent is more likely an uncertain or a probabilistic right (Ayres and Klemperer (1999), Shapiro 
(2003), Lemley and Shapiro (2005)). The two most important points are that some of the dubious 
patents are of large economic significance and the enforcement uncertainty is largely strengthened 
by the issuance of too many bad quality patents.   
Three questions emerge: 1/ why are so many bad quality patents granted by a patent office? 2/ how 
does the uncertainty on the patents’ quality affect the choice of a protection regime? 3/ to what 
extent do the patent holder and potential infringers prefer to settle their private disputes on the 
patent's validity rather than pursue their litigation in front of a court, and what are the consequences 
of these private settlements on market competition?   
  
II.1 Two Views the Reasons for the Issuance of Bad Quality Patents 
Besides the anecdotal evidence on some exotic patents,12 we know that a large number of 
economically valuable products are protected by weak patents, i.e. patents that would likely be 
invalidated by a court if they were the subjects of litigation. Examples include drugs such as Lipitor, 
genetic material such as the stem cells of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF), the 
Breast Cancer Genes BRCA1 and BRCA2 (Myriad Genetics), software such as the File Allocation Table 
(FAT) by Microsoft, etc.13 
Why are so many bad quality patents granted by the USPTO? To answer this question, Lei and Wright 
(2010) contrast two possible explanations. The first relies on the “rational ignorance” principle 
advanced by Lemley (2001), according to which the USPTO examiners voluntarily conduct insufficient 
prior art search that could render weak patents unpatentable. Lemley argues that by so doing, US 
examiners “are ‘rationally ignorant’ of the objective validity of patents… because it is too costly for 
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them to discover those facts.” Given the skewed nature of the patent value distribution, “society 
would be better off economizing on examinations, deferring rigorous determination of validity until 
the patent enters litigation.” The second explanation denies the examiner’s ignorance and focuses on 
the existence of an “institutional pro-applicant bias” in the USPTO.  “There exists a pro-applicant bias 
of policies and procedures at the USPTO that renders patent examiners’ effort useless: they are 
encouraged by various institutional incentives to accept applications that they nevertheless perceive 
to be ineligible” (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). There are at least three institutional biases that force the 
USPTO examiners to grant undeserved patents: i/burden of proof; ii/ incentives; iii/ continuation and 
divisional patents.  
i/ Burden of proof. In the US as in Europe, an applicant does not have to prove that the application is 
patentable. It is the examiner's burden to prove that the application is unpatentable, which is 
generally a very time consuming task. The opposition procedure in Europe allows a third party to 
make an opposition. This procedure is adversarial between the challenger and the patent holder. By 
contrast, in the United States, the re-examination procedure does not involve any adversarial 
procedure since it maintains an exclusive relationship between the applicant and the patent 
examiner (Graham et al. 2004, Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004). 
ii/ Incentives. US patent examiners are mainly rewarded on granted patents, and do not bear the 
aftermath of granting questionable patents. “The salaries of US examiners are tied to the number of 
applications they process: they have production quotas to meet, and earn bonuses when they exceed 
their quotas by at least 10%...Importantly, they are never liable in the event patents are invalidated in 
court and there are no negative consequences for examiners who produce low-quality work” 
(Langinier & Marcoule, 2009). In Europe, the rewards of EPO examiners are equivalent to those at 
USPTO, but the tie between salary and productivity is somewhat less stringent. This difference is 
illustrated by a lower workload for European examiners than for American ones: the number of 
filings per examiner is 37 at the EPO and 97 at the USPTO, and the pendency allowed for both the 
prior art search and the examination process is 50 months at the EPO vs. 27 months at the USPTO. 
These figures may explain why the EPO grants fewer dubious patents than the USPTO, and illustrate 
the importance of the quantity-quality trade-off in the patent system (Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe, 2007, ch.7).  
iii/ Continuation and divisional patents. Continuation and divisional patents are common practices. 
“A continuation is a second application for the same invention claimed in a prior nonprovisional 
application and filed before the original prior application becomes abandoned or patented.  A 
divisional application or division is a later application for an independent or distinct invention, carved 
out of a pending application and claiming only subject matter disclosed in the earlier or parent 
application. Continuations are not permitted by the EPO and the JPO but are allowed by the USPTO. 
Divisional patents are permitted by the EPO, and provide a kind of alternative to continuations.” 
(Hedge et al, 2007). Such applications offer means to tune a patent’s claims to changing 
circumstances. According to Lemley (2012), in the US, the use of continuations is largely applicant‐ 
rather than examiner driven. Moreover, the ability of applicants to file an unlimited number of 
continuation applications – and their willingness to do so – makes it difficult for examiners to simply 
reject bad applications. “Applicants view a rejection as simply a negotiating position that invites a 
counteroffer, not as a judgment that their application is in fact unpatentable. And because they can 
continue making counteroffers, increasing the number of rejections simply prolongs the application 
process” (Lemley, 2012).   
In order to test whether the rational ignorance principle or the institutional bias best explains the 
issuance of bad quality patents in the US, Lei and Wright (2010) construct a sample of twin patents, 
i.e. patents that are filed to both the USPTO and the EPO during the period 1990 - 1995 and are 
granted by the USPTO while resulting at the EPO in one of the three possible outcomes: granted, 
rejected or withdrawn by the applicant. They assume that the European Patent Office (EPO) grants 
fewer dubious patents than the USPTO and they test whether the rate of failure at the EPO is linked 
to the prior art research effort made by US examiners. The outcome of a patent prosecution at the 
EPO is used as an indicator of the patents' strength: an application for a weak patent would have a 
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high probability to be either withdrawn by the applicant or rejected by the EPO. In order to measure 
the prior art research effort made by USPTO examiners, the authors define the Prior Patents Search 
Intensity (PPSI) by the ratio PPSI = CPP/(CPP+UPP), where the variable CPP is the number of Cited 
Prior Patents, and the variable UPP is the number of Uncited Prior Patents, both evaluated for each 
patent. While the number of Cited Prior Patents (CPP) appears directly in the application, the number 
of Uncited Prior Patents (UPP) was computed by the authors by using a specific algorithm (Latent 
Semantic Analysis). The higher the value of the PPSI ratio, the higher is the research effort devoted 
by the examiners to find the appropriate prior art. The purpose is to test which one of the two 
following alternative hypotheses H1 and H2 best explains the issuance of weak patents by the USPTO, 
i.e. patents that are withdrawn or rejected by examiners at the EPO:  
H1: Rational ignorance: a USPTO patent with a high amount of cited prior art (i.e. a patent having a 
high PPSI) signals a strong patent that would have a high probability to be accepted by the EPO.  
H2: Institutional bias: a USPTO patent with a high amount of cited prior art (i.e. a patent having a high 
PPSI) signals a weak patent that would have a high probability to be rejected by the EPO or 
withdrawn by the applicant while it is granted by the USPTO. 
The main econometric result of Lei and Wright is in favor of H2: the probability of failure at the EPO is 
significantly and positively affected by the PPSI ratio, measuring the research intensity of the prior art 
at the USPTO. This result suggests that US examiners devote important prior research intensity to 
patents that they perceive as being weak, but despite their negative perception, the rules and 
procedures of the USPTO force them to grant a patent to these weak applications. In other words, 
even though US examiners ultimately fail to reject weak patents, their revealed evaluation measured 
by the PPSI ratio is a significant predictor of the application outcome at the EPO. 
Lemley (2012) suggests two ways to improve, at least partially, the quality of granted patents: a 
tiered review process and a post-grant opposition procedure: “To harness information in the hands of 
patent applicants, we could give applicants the option of earning a presumption of validity by paying 
for a thorough examination of their inventions. Put differently, applicants should be allowed to “gold 
plate” their patents by paying for the kind of searching review that would merit a strong presumption 
of validity. An applicant who chooses not to pay could still get a patent. That patent, however, would 
be subject to serious—maybe even de novo—review in the event of litigation”… “Post‐grant 
opposition is a process by which parties other than the applicant have the opportunity to request and 
fund a thorough examination of a recently issued patent. A patent that survives collateral attack 
should earn a presumption of validity similar to the one available through tiered review. The core 
difference is that the post‐grant opposition is triggered by competitors—presumably competitors 
looking to invalidate a patent that threatens their industry. Like tiered review, post‐grant opposition 
is attractive because it harnesses private information; this time, information in the hands of 
competitors. It thus helps the PTO to identify patents that warrant serious review, and it also makes 
that review less expensive by creating a mechanism by which competitors can share critical 
information directly with the PTO. A post‐grant opposition system is part of the new America Invents 
Act, but it won’t begin to apply for another several years14, and the new system will be unavailable to 
many competitors because of the short time limits for filing an opposition”.  
 
II.2 Choice of the Protection Regime: “Big Secrets” and “Little Patents” 
A first consequence of the uncertainty attached to a patent is related to the choice made by an 
inventor to protect his innovation. Empirical studies from inventors’ surveys (Cohen et al. 2000, Levin 
et al. 1987, Arundel and Kabla 1998) revealed that in many industrial sectors, the resort to patents 
was not the preferred form of protection of innovators. What drives the individual choice between 
patent or other forms of protection?15 Some theoretical studies tried to answer this question by 
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taking into account the strength of a patent, evaluated as the probability that a court confirms both 
the patent’s validity and the infringement. For a strong patent, the probability is close to one, while 
for a weak patent, it is close to zero. Consider a process innovation that allows the reduction of 
production costs. The approach developed by Anton and Yao (2004) involves the asymmetry of 
information between the inventor and third parties: the inventor knows precisely the amount of the 
cost reduction allowed by the innovation, but third parties, including potential competitors, have 
only partial information. The information that reaches them depends on what the innovator chooses 
to disclose when patenting its innovation. The cost reduction level disclosed in the patent thus 
becomes a strategic choice for the patent applicant.16 However, the imitator can also obtain 
additional information by himself if he chooses to reverse engineer the innovation. Anton and Yao 
(2004) show that choosing the patent protection leads to two opposite effects. On one hand, there is 
an imitation effect: a weaker patent will contain less information, because the potential imitator has 
lower chances of being convicted and fined by a court when the patent is weak. Therefore, since it is 
in the interest of the imitator to copy everything disclosed in the patent by the holder, a weak patent 
holder’s interest is to disclose as little as possible. On the other hand, there is a signal effect: a strong 
patent encourages a high level of disclosure. Indeed, because a strong patent is unlikely to be 
imitated, it is not risky for a strong patent holder to disclose the effective cost reduction, thus 
signalling his technological advance to competitors. Obviously, this reasoning would not hold with a 
weak patent. Overall, the level of disclosed information allows an arbitrage between the two effects 
described above. Using a signalling game framework, Anton and Yao (2004) show that in equilibrium, 
only those process innovations with a cost reduction inferior to a certain threshold stand to gain 
from being patented, while innovations with value superior to this threshold benefit more from 
being kept secret. The main result of this model, in which patent protection is probabilistic, is that 
the arbitrage between patent and secret leads to the patenting issue solely for low-value innovations 
(the so called “little patents”) which have a small chance of being imitated. In contrast, high-value 
innovations are better protected by secret (“big secrets”). Note that in the model of Anton and Yao 
(2004), the decision to imitate or not results from the amount of information the innovator chooses 
to disclose, and not from the independent imitator’s choice. 
An alternative approach is developed in Encaoua and Lefouili (2005). In that model, the decision to 
imitate or not is assumed to depend directly on the imitator’s behaviour and not on the innovator’s 
choice. The emphasis is put on three factors: i) the strength of the patent as previously defined; ii) 
the relative cost of imitation, whether the innovation is patented or kept secret, the cost of imitation  
being lower for a patent due to the compulsory disclosure; iii) the size of the innovation defined as 
the cost reduction allowed by the process innovation. Furthermore, the level of imitation is an 
endogenous variable chosen by the potential imitator. Then, the interactions between these 
different factors lead to novel situations. For example, the choice of patenting the innovation leads 
to a level of imitation that can differ from the level that would have arisen if the innovation had been 
kept secret. Moreover, the innovator can be better off when imitated if the loss he suffers on the 
market from being imitated is more than compensated by the expected value of collected damages. 
Two effects are thus identified.17 The first, called the damages effect, says that with identical levels of 
imitation, the innovator will always prefer a patent to trade secret, because the imitation of a patent 
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leads to compensation in the form of damages. The second effect, called the competition effect, 
makes more explicit the influence of the imitation level on the innovator’s profit. As stated above, 
this level of imitation can differ according to the protection mode. If the imitation level is lower for a 
patented innovation than for a secret innovation, the competition effect reinforces the damages 
effect: the innovator will prefer a patent. However, if the imitation level is higher for a patented 
innovation than for a secret innovation, the two effects go in opposite directions. The composition of 
the two effects necessitates in this case a deeper analysis. Adopting the expression of damages that 
result from the unjust enrichment doctrine, Encaoua and Lefouili (2005) reach the following 
conclusion: in the perfect equilibrium of the 3-stage game, where the protective choice is made at 
the first stage, the decision to imitate and the choice of the imitation level are made at the second 
stage, and Cournot competition on the product market occurs in the third stage, there exists a 
threshold such that the innovations involving a cost reduction below the threshold are always 
patented, while those with a cost reduction above the threshold are better protected by secret. The 
result is consistent with the one obtained by Anton and Yao (2004) albeit in a different framework. It 
finally challenges the justification for the patent as a universal protection instrument for 
innovation.18 
 
II.3 Private Settlements   
Challenging a patent’s validity through litigation is costly and uneasy for at least three reasons. First, 
the patent holder may contractually prevent litigating.19 Second, the required clear and convincing 
evidence standard in the US to prove invalidity is in general very demanding for the challenger, 
especially for new patentable subject matters like software.20 Third, challenging has the dimension of 
a public good: a firm benefits from a successful challenge initiated by another competitor, since it 
gets the new technology freely. Therefore, the individual incentives to challenge a patent’s validity 
are low. This is why disputes on weak patents are more frequently solved through private 
settlements than through a judicial litigation procedure.  But not only are patents for which litigation 
go to completion in front of a US Court invalidated in a high proportion (about 50% according to 
Allison and Lemley, 1998), they also include patents of great commercial value.21 For these three 
reasons, private settlements are often preferred to legal proceedings. But, even if public policy 
encourages private settlements of legal disputes, it does not follow that all settlements are 
consistent with the public interest. Gilbert (2006) makes the following distinction: “If the patent is 
valid and would be infringed, the patent gives its owner the right to exclude a rival that employs the 
teaching of the patent, and a settlement that allows the alleged infringer to stay in the market would 
not be anticompetitive. On the other hand, if the patent is not valid or would not be infringed, a 
settlement between a patentee and a potential entrant that limits the ability of the entrant to 
compete against the patentee could harm competition that would have occurred in the absence of 
the settlement.”  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
which is always positive, corresponds to the damages effect. The second term corresponds to the competition 
effect. It can be positive (if d’2 > d2) or negative (if d’2 < d2). 
18
 Note that both the models of Anton and Yao (2004) and Encaoua and Lefouili (2005) focus on process 
innovations. We are not aware of an existing analysis of the choice between patent and secret for product 
innovations. 
19
 For instance, in Japan, Microsoft forced its licensed OEM suppliers to pledge not to file lawsuits on the 
grounds that Windows infringes a patent right. 
20 This is illustrated by the recent i4i vs Microsoft case. See Supreme Court of the United States, Microsoft Corp. 
v. I4I Limited Partnership et al.  Certiorari to the US Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit, 9 June 2011.  
21
 To illustrate this last point, Chiron’s patent on monoclonal antibodies specific to breast cancer antigens was 
invalidated in 2002 in a suit in which Chiron had sought over $1 billion in damages from Genentech. Another 
example relates to the Prozac drug. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit invalidated an Eli Lilly 
patent on Prozac in 2000 and caused Lilly’s stock price to drop 31% in a day. 
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We discuss briefly two types of private settlements that affect negatively the competition in the 
product market: the so-called “reverse payments” practice observed in the pharmaceutical industry 
and the specific “per-unit royalty licensing scheme” that occurs under the shadow of patent litigation.  
i/ Reverse payments in the pharmaceutical industry. Some branded pharmaceutical companies pay a 
large amount of money to a generic producer to delay its entry in their market.  This practice harms 
the society since it delays access to a less expensive generic drug. However, it is not obvious whether 
this practice violates antitrust rules.22 On the two sides of the Atlantic, the antitrust enforcers believe 
that reverse payments are anticompetitive since they improperly raise consumer costs by keeping 
out less expensive generic drugs. But some differences appear between the US and the EU. In the US, 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Courts have radically opposed views on this practice. 
While the FTC considers such settlements as unlawful regardless of who ultimately would have won 
the patent litigation, the US courts reject this reasoning, requiring those challenging such reverse 
payments to show that the settlement impacts competition for products not covered by the patents, 
or that the underlying patent infringement is objectively baseless or based on fraud. In Europe, both 
the Directorate-General for Competition and the Court of First Instance (CFI) seem to agree in 
condemning private settlements that involve a reverse payment, whether the patent is valid or not 
(as illustrated by the recent Boehringer Ingelheim vs Almirall). Moreover, commentators differ 
markedly in their views of reverse payment settlements. Some of them believe that, in the US, 
reverse payments are a consequence of the facilitation of generic entry procedure derived from the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.23 Others consider that the reverse payment cases constitute an “important 
category of cases in which the terms of the settlement themselves tend to indicate that the patent 
was weak and thus that competition was diminished by the settlement” (Shapiro, 2003).  
ii/ Licensing a weak patent under the shadow of patent litigation. Consider the situation where the 
holder of a patented process innovation is confronted to a set of oligopolistic firms that are potential 
users of the cost-reducing innovation.  Suppose that the patent covering this innovation is weak. 
Licensing it under the shadow of patent litigation implies that the patent holder prefers to license its 
patent at a price that deters any challenge rather than the option to pursue an infringer in a Court, 
since in a trial the infringer will likely try to challenge the patent’s validity. Therefore the licensing 
price is such that any potential licensee will prefer to accept the license rather than to litigate the 
patent’s validity. In other words, licensing a weak patent under the shadow of patent litigation 
                                                          
22
 The assessment of this practice by the US Supreme Court is illustrated by this quotation extracted from  
“Brief for the US as Amicus Curiae in  Federal Trade Commission, Petitioner v. Schering-Plough Corporation, et 
al.” (US Supreme Court 05-273):  “Patent litigation settlements that include reverse payments thus implicate 
conflicting policy considerations and complex legal issues at the intersection of patent and antitrust law, with 
further complexity introduced in the pharmaceutical context by the dynamics of the Hatch-Waxman Act. On the 
one hand, the interests in consumer welfare protected by the antitrust laws militate against adoption of a legal 
standard that would facilitate patent holders’ efforts to preserve weak patents by dividing their monopoly 
profits with settling challengers. The risks are magnified when the settling parties are in a position to utilize the 
Hatch-Waxman exclusivity period to further constrain competition from other generic manufacturers. On the 
other hand, the public policy favoring settlements, and the statutory right of patentees to exclude competition 
within the scope of their patents, would potentially be frustrated by a rule of law that subjected patent 
settlements involving reverse payments to automatic or near-automatic invalidation”. 
23 One of the peculiarities introduced by the Hatch-Waxman Act (1984) is to allow a generic drug to avoid the 
usual tests (known as the NDA, New Drug Application) required by the Federal Drug Agency  to obtain the 
market’s entry approval. For a generic, the Hatch-Waxman Act requires a less demanding test (known as the 
ANDA, Abbreviated New Drug Application). An ANDA requires only demonstrating that the proposed generic 
drug is bioequivalent to an approved pioneer drug.  Providing evidence of safety and effectiveness from clinical 
data or from the scientific literature is not necessary. To compensate such easier entry by generics, the Hatch-
Waxman Act extended the patent length of the brand name drug by restoring the time period lost while 
awaiting NDA approval. The maximum extension period is capped at a five-year period, or a total effective 
patent term after the extension of not more than 14 years (see, Thomas, 2006; Appelt, 2010). 
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implies a licensing scheme that deters any litigation.24 A recent paper by Amir et al. (2011) 
investigates the nature of the best licensing scheme when the patent is weak and asks whether the 
result is robust against features that matter when the patent is certain.  The main result in Amir et al. 
is that a weak patent holder prefers a per-unit royalty to a fixed fee when the positive price effect 
outweighs the negative quantity effect of a cost increase. The authors show that this condition is 
satisfied regardless of whether: i/ the licensor is an outsider or an insider in the downward oligopoly 
market, ii/ the licensees compete à la Cournot or a la Bertrand and, iii/ the downward market 
includes homogeneous or differentiated products. Thus, contrary to what happens for an ironclad 
right, the owner of a weak patent always prefers a per-unit royalty to a fixed fee.25 Licensing a weak 
patent with per-unit royalty allows the patent holder to extract more revenues than with a fixed fee, 
because the licensee can pass the corresponding unit cost increase to the consumers, explaining why 
licensees also prefer a per unit royalty. The only agents that suffer are the consumers of the final 
product: they pay a higher price than they would if the patent’s assessment was made prior to 
licensing.  Therefore licensing a weak patent under the shadow of patent litigation raises both a 
private problem and a public problem. The private problem arises because individual potential 
licensees have insufficient incentives to challenge the patent’s validity alone: this is a direct 
consequence of the public good nature of challenging.26 A public policy problem also arises because a 
weak patent holder is able to harm consumers by setting a per-unit royalty that increases the cost 
and therefore the price. 
 
III. Sequential Innovations, Hold-up and Competition in Technological Markets.  
 
We have so far examined the case of a discrete innovation and have analyzed the effects of the 
uncertainty relative to the patent’s validity by showing how this uncertainty affects the competition 
on the product market. We now examine the effects of patents covering follow-up or sequential 
innovations in the sense that each innovation is built on previous patented knowledge. In such a 
framework, the delimitation of property rights between downstream and upstream innovators 
becomes crucial (Scotchmer, 2004). The uncertainty inherent to this delimitation is likely to result 
into a hold-up. For instance, a patent holder can unpredictably block the activities of an existing 
producer, accusing him of using the technology protected by the patent without the owner's 
consent.27 The plaintiff can be either the patent owner himself or some other party acting on behalf 
of the presumed infringed party.28 The plaintiff can obtain from a court an injunction ordering the 
                                                          
24
 A recent OECD Inquiry (Zuniga and Guellec, 2009) finds that avoiding patent litigation is an important motive 
of licensing.  
25
 The intuition of this result may be summarized as follows. For a certainly valid patent, the patent holder 
cannot control the number of licensees when a per-unit royalty is used while he can with a fixed fee license. 
This advantage of fixed fee over per-unit royalty contracts is absent when the holder of a weak patent wants to 
make a license offer that deters litigation: indeed such offer has to be accepted by all firms. This suggests that a 
per-unit royalty scheme can be preferred over a fixed fee scheme if the patent is weak whereas the reverse 
holds if the patent is valid with certainty. Moreover, since licensing occurs ex ante, i.e. before an assessment of 
the patent’s validity, the per-unit royalty licensing revenue is greater than the expected revenue obtained 
when licensing occurs after the patent’s validity assessment, whereas a fixed fee licensing leads to the same 
revenue whether licensing is made ex ante or ex post. 
26
 The Patent Reform Act (2011) recently adopted in the US tries to include different measures addressing the 
insufficient incentives to challenge a weak patent, by introducing for example some adversarial procedures to 
challenge a patent’s validity as it exists in Europe. 
27
 It is interesting to note that it is precisely in this sequential innovation framework that Bessen and Maskin 
(2009) could show that imitation was not socially reprehensible, thus reducing the necessity for patents. 
28
 The third party acting on behalf of the patent’s owner is called a Non-Practicing Entity, sometimes qualified 
as a patent troll.   
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definitive cessation of the activities of the presumed infringer.29 Should the threat of injunction be 
considered as an abusive way for the patent holder to obtain ex post a substantial financial 
compensation in the settlement or does it correspond to the normal use of a right attached to the 
patent? The question is complex and does not receive a consensual answer. Some believe that a 
patent holder has the right to use the threat of injunction since it is a tool to deter a third party from 
using the patent unduly. Others believe the opposite, arguing that the threat of injunction 
corresponds to an opportunistic hold-up behavior since it occurs after the victim started its 
productive activities. 30 The following paragraph briefly presents some contributions justifying these 
different positions. 
 
III.1 Injunctions, Hold-Up and Excessive Royalties: Shapiro’s Model 
The contribution by Shapiro (2010) analyzes the links between the level of royalties and the 
injunction power in a bargaining model in which the patented innovation of an upstream producer is 
an input for a downstream producer. By spending a specific cost, the downstream producer can get 
around the patented input and build a substitute. The model integrates the following elements: i) the 
patent protecting the upstream input is uncertain, which leads to the consideration of the patent’s 
strength as a parameter of the model; ii) the value-added derived by the downstream producer from 
the upstream input is assumed to be observable; iii) if a court upholds the patent’s validity and 
recognizes the infringement, an injunction to stop the downstream production is legally executable; 
iv) the amount of reasonable royalties that the patent holder could have obtained ex ante is known 
by both participants; and v) the final demand facing the downstream producer does not depend on 
the royalty paid for using the upstream input. Ex ante, the downstream producer may be either 
informed or uninformed of the existence of a patent covering the input. A central investigation of the 
model is to assess the effect of the injunction on the royalty. This is obtained by computing the gap 
between the effective royalty and the reasonable royalty, the effective royalty being defined as the 
Nash solution of a bargaining game, in which the outcomes of a preliminary injunction serve as the 
threat point.  Without much surprise, one of the principal results of the Shapiro’s model (2010) is 
that the gap is larger when the downstream producer decides to use the input before the uncertainty 
on the patent is resolved. This patent ambush effect highlights the fact that a patented input can 
penalize an uninformed user.31 A more surprising result is that the excessive part of the royalty is 
larger when: 1) the share of the upstream input in the value-added of the final product is smaller; 2) 
the injunction power of the patent holder is higher; 3) the protection of the upstream input results 
from a patent pending, in other words not yet published when the producer decides to incorporate 
the input in its product. These results led Shapiro to suggest restrictive conditions under which an 
injunction rule may be authorized. The exceptional conditions recommended by the Supreme Court 
in the eBay v. MercExchange case serve to define these restrictions: i) the prejudice suffered by the 
                                                          
29
 The best illustration is given by the Blackberry’s story. In November 2001, the firm NTP, Inc. was filing a 
complaint with Virginia State Court of Justice, against the Canadian firm Research in Motion (RIM), producer of 
the Blackberry mobile phone, for the usage of technologies protected by old patents that are not yet expired, 
held by NTP. After long legal proceedings, including a re-examination of the aforementioned patents by the 
USPTO, the Court pronounced RIM guilty, and condemned the firm to pay damages and stop production of the 
Blackberry. The injunction decision remained pending during the appeal procedures brought by RIM with the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). After confirmation by the latter of the previous court’s decision, 
RIM reached a private settlement in 2006, agreeing to pay $612.5 million to NTP, obtaining that NTP would 
withdraw its complaint. The most significant aspect of this example is that after the settlement, NTP’s patent 
has been invalidated by the Patent Office! 
30
 The Supreme Court of the United States expressed in an ulterior affair (eBay v. MercExchange) some reserves 
against the justification of preliminary injunction and restricted the use of this practice to the so-called 
exceptional circumstances. 
31
  The ability of a patent holder to negotiate ex post a level of royalties that is superior to what would be 
reasonable ex ante is one of the advanced reasons to explain the rate of growth of the number of patent 
applications. 
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plaintiff is irreparable; ii) monetary damages are insufficient to compensate the prejudice; iii) given 
the prejudices of the plaintiff and the defendant, affecting the capital of the defendant is 
appropriate; iv) no component of society, other than the defendant, should be negatively affected by 
the injunction. Shapiro’s model recommends the use by the plaintiff of a preliminary injunction only 
under these stringent conditions. In the following paragraph, the objections to this model are 
examined.32 
 
III.2. Criticisms of Shapiro's Model 
The critics formulated by Sidak (2007) and Denicolò et al. (2007) are of many orders. First, they 
challenge a recommendation that unfairly favours the defendant to the detriment of the plaintiff. 
Second, they also challenge the overly negative vision of a plaintiff that is not the patent’s owner. 
They present counter-examples of patent trolls in the biotechnology sector that had an important 
role in technology exchanges. Third, they show that the conclusions of the Shapiro model rest on 
assumptions that are not necessarily satisfied in the real world. Among the challenged assumptions 
are the following: i) infringement is always detected; ii) the value-added of the patented component 
is supposed to be small relative to the value-added of the product and perfectly observable by a 
court; iv) the final demand facing the downstream producer does not depend on the amount of the 
per-unit royalty demanded by the patent holder. The more likely assumption that information is 
imperfect should lead to an ex post level of royalty lower than the one predicted by Shapiro. 
Moreover, Sidak (2007) argues that since the user of the patented input benefits from the fact that 
the inventor had to experiment a lot before coming up with the patented innovation, he must incur 
costs that go well above the value-added of the patented input. It is as if the user benefited from a 
real option value by having delayed the production of its good until the inventor of the input 
perfected his invention. For all these reasons, the notion of excessive royalties loses some of its 
relevance.  
Denicolò et al. (2007) propose an alternative framework. The assumption is made that the value-
added by the patented input is private information for the defendant, and therefore is not 
observable by third parties, notably by a court. Thus, the amount of the reasonable royalty which 
serves as benchmark is itself indeterminate. It is therefore impossible for a court to evaluate the part 
of the royalty demanded by the plaintiff that is due solely to the injunction. The solution to this 
problem of asymmetric information suggested by the authors is that the court proposes an arbitrary 
royalty, and that the defendant uses it as an option value. If the level of the royalty proposed by the 
court is superior to the value of the input estimated by the defendant, the defendant has the 
possibility to request a renegotiation of the royalty with the plaintiff. But, if the royalty proposed by 
the court is inferior to the input's value, as estimated by the plaintiff, the plaintiff will have to be 
satisfied with this level.33 
To summarize, the question of knowing whether the plaintiff should be allowed or not to use a 
preliminary injunction does not have a trivial answer. In any case, the answer to this question should 
be based on a rule of reason rather than on a per se prohibition of the injunction. In the Apple vs 
Motorola case, the argument of Judge Posner for refusing to ban Motorola’s products from the 
shelves, as Apple sought, was that “an injunction that imposes greater costs on the defendant than it 
confers benefits on the plaintiff reduces net social welfare”. Moreover, the case where the injunction 
is obtained on behalf of a patent pending must be treated with greater caution. The role of patents 
pending examined below is sufficiently ambiguous to justify a special treatment. 
 
III.3. Role of Divisional and Continuation Patents 
                                                          
32
 Elhauge (2008) challenges one of the conclusions of the models by Lemley and Shapiro (2007) and Shapiro 
(2006), which states that royalties obtained by “surprise” are too high. 
33
 The authors do not explicitly list the reasons that incite the plaintiff to accept a renegotiation if the royalty 
proposed by the court is superior to the value estimated by the defendant, nor the reasons that incite the 
plaintiff to accept the royalty proposed by the court if it is inferior to the value estimated by the defendant. 
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According to the OECD (2009), the number of patents pending is probably superior to the volume of 
patents granted that are still in force. Even if a patent is enforceable only if granted, patents pending 
still have a value. Indeed, they offer to the depositor a temporary protection until the office has 
made a decision. In particular, complaints for patent infringement can be ruled in favour of the 
plaintiff even if the infringing behaviour took place during the time the patent still pending. For this 
reason, patents pending can be instruments as powerful, if not more, as granted patents. 
Furthermore, patents pending have a greater degree of uncertainty than existing patents, since it is 
unknown if they will be granted, and if so on which date it will happen and whether they will 
correspond to strong or weak patents, since the nature and the scope of their claims are not known.  
Since many divisional and continuation patent applications originate from the initial depositors, they 
tend to reduce the transparency on the contents of what is protected, and delay the date on which 
these protected claims are made public. These applications can give rise to abuses. For example, an 
initial depositor can claim ownership of inventions of which he is not the author, by giving as an 
argument the existence of a patent pending, the date of which is the initial patent date.34 The rule of 
the first to file that applies presently in all countries amplifies this risk. Some observers anticipate 
that the recent “America Invents Act” law which shifted from a first to invent to a first to file principle 
“will touch off a paper chase to the patent office instead of a race to innovate” (The New York Times, 
August 26, 2012). 
Even if it may be legal from the point of view of intellectual property law, hold-up behaviour based 
on pending applications constitute a large obstacle to competition, notably on technological markets, 
since it prevents some producers from pursuing the commercial exploitation of their activities. This 
situation is the reason why a report from the Federal Trade Commission in 201135 put a particular 
emphasis on the requirement to clarify the notification procedures (procedures that consist in 
revealing the contents of what is patented and the scope of protection), both for granted patents 
and patents pending. The precision of the notification affects the competition at each step of the 
innovation process. The capacity of an operator to identify existing patents or pending applications 
allows him to negotiate ex ante a license, and thus to shield himself from the risk of apparition of 
blocking patents (Green and Scotchmer, 1995). In the absence of precise information, the possibility 
of being victim of a threat of injunction can cause socially useful investment in R&D to never be 
undertaken, or lead to high levels of royalties be paid ex post to the patent holder. Moreover, an 
incomplete notification procedure does not allow potential users to negotiate ex ante the amount of 
royalties to be paid. To sum-up, pending patent applications seriously affect competition conditions 
on the market for technological exchanges. 
 
IV. Patent Pools, Standards and Competition in Innovation Markets 
 
A third conception of the role of patents is based on activities that require the simultaneous use of 
many inputs, each being protected by an independent patent. This situation corresponds to a 
configuration of cumulative innovation that Scotchmer (2004) designates under the metaphor of 
Research Tools. This configuration is somewhat different from the sequential innovation examined in 
the preceding paragraph. The central point is now the piling of scattered patents (Denicolò and 
Halmenschlager, 2012). This situation is common to many activities, such as the pharmaceutical 
industry, in which patents on genetic codes are essential for the development of new therapeutic 
targets, or such as the software industry in which a number of computer programs, which have their 
code protected, play a considerable role in the development of new software. The great number of 
patents involved impedes the prior negotiation between one user and every patent holder, giving 
                                                          
34
 “Filing of divisional applications enables some brand name pharmaceuticals to maintain the uncertainty 
generated by their parent patent application and to sue the producers of generic drugs that try to enter the 
market, in the ignorance of pending patent applications and their respective content”  (European Commission, 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary Report, 28 November 2008). 
35
 FTC, “The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition”, 2011. 
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rise to the tragedy of the anti-commons, a concept penned by Heller (1998) and Heller and Eisenberg 
(1998), and tested empirically by Murray and Stern (2007) and Cockburn et al. (2010). According to 
this phenomenon, fragmented property rights on a common resource lead to a sub-utilization of that 
resource. Furthermore, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and Ziedonis (2004) showed that if patents on 
complementary innovations were highly dispersed among owners, firms requiring these patents 
would in turn intensively patent their own innovations to obtain a higher bargaining power with 
regards to the patent holders. This observation illustrates the role of patent portfolios as negotiation 
instruments (bargaining chips in the language of Hall and Ziedonis). In what follows, we examine: i/ 
the question of the competition bias that results from the multiplication of patents (patent thicket) 
required to produce a good (IV.1); ii/ the problems highlighted by the grouping of these patents in a 
patent pool (IV.2); iii/ and finally the questions posed by technological standards, essential patents 
and their licensing rules (IV.3).  
 
IV.1 Competition Bias due to the Patent Thicket Problem 
 
A patent thicket is a situation in which a technology is covered by many patents owned by different 
parties. It is defined by Shapiro (2001) in the following way: "a dense web of overlapping intellectual 
property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new 
technology." The multiplication of patent thickets in varied sectors such as semi-conductors, 
biotechnologies, nanotechnologies and informatics software (Ayres and Parchomovsky, 2007; IPO, 
2011) poses a number of problems.36 In particular, because of patent thickets, potential users of a 
technology must pay royalties to multiple patent owners, each of them benefiting to a certain extent 
from veto power on the new innovation. Patent thickets considerably increase the costs of 
negotiation between the patent owners and the user, who must obtain many licences before being 
able to innovate. From the viewpoint of microeconomic theory, each patent owner can be seen as a 
monopoly that controls an input necessary for the production of the new innovation.37 The existence 
of the patent thicket could then lead to a weakening of the incentives to innovate, if the sum of the 
individual royalties is sufficiently high to make the planned innovation not profitable. The multiplicity 
of essential patents can thus block ulterior innovations. This issue is important, especially when these 
patents are part of the elaboration of technological standards, and when users have incurred sunk 
costs to achieve conformity with that standard. How can we eliminate the inefficiency associated 
with essential patents and with the double margin phenomenon? The economic literature proposes 
various solutions. A first solution consists of the establishment of a system of cross licensing with or 
without reciprocal royalties. As underlined by Shapiro (2001, p. 123), "If two patent holders are the 
only companies realistically capable of manufacturing products that utilize their intellectual property 
rights, a royalty-free cross licence is ideal from the view point of ex post competition. But any cross 
license is superior to a world in which the patent holders fail to cooperate, since neither could proceed 
with actual production and sale in that world without infringing on the other's patents." A second 
solution, examined in the following paragraph, is the creation of patent pools. 
 
IV.2. Patent Pools 
 
                                                          
36
 The reader will find in Lemley and Shapiro (2005) an in-depth analysis of the reasons explaining the 
multiplication of patent thickets. Also, IPO (2011) provides an analysis of the different real-life situations that 
are covered by this definition. 
37
 This problem, analogous to that of the double margin, is well known in industrial economics. An enterprise 
who must buy various inputs, each from separate monopolies, will pay a global price that is higher than the 
price that would be paid if all the inputs were sold by a single monopoly. As highlighted by Shapiro (2001), "this 
is merely a magnified version of the monopoly burden resulting from the patent itself, but it is well to remember 
Cournot's lesson that the multiple burdens reduce both consumer welfare and the profits of patentees in 
comparison with a coordinated licensing approach." 
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Patent pools are widely used to cover technologies that are part of technological standards. We will 
first present arguments in favour and against patent pools (IV.2.1), before examining specific issues 
related to essential patents in technological standards (IV.2.2). 
 
IV.2.1. Arguments in favour and against patent pools 
 
A patent pool can be defined as an "agreement among patent owners to license a set of their patents 
to one another or third parties" (Lerner and Tirole, 2004). Put differently, patent pools "aim at 
granting a single license for a package of patents belonging to different owners" (Lévêque and 
Menière, 2007). Organizing joint licensing of all the patents which read for instance on a 
technological standard is a way to save transaction costs that are inherent to separate licensing.38 
Examples of patent pools include MPEG-2 (1997), MPEG-4 (1998), Bluetooth (1998), DVD-ROM 
(1998), DVD-Video (1999), 3G Mobile Communications (2001) and One-Blue (2009). Patent pool 
members have long been suspected of facilitating the implementation of anti-competitive behaviour. 
However, this view has been challenged recently as competition authorities now recognize that they 
may contribute to "integrating complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing 
blocking positions, decreasing infringement litigation39 and the uncertainties related to it, and 
promoting the dissemination of technologies" (US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission, 2007, pp. 84-85).40 The doctrine now defended by the US Department of Justice about 
patent pools is the following: (i) a pool can contain only essential patents, namely patents that are 
necessary to implement a given technology;41 (ii) a pool should include a provision allowing for 
independent licensing (i.e. the requirement that independent licences be offered by pool members 
to third parties); and (iii) the royalty rates and the grant-back provisions must be subject to particular 
monitoring.42 The European Commission shares the positions of the US Department of Justice, but 
goes further in its guidelines on the structure and organisation of a patent pool.43 
 
Two types of questions are important in the analysis of the effects of patent pools on competition in 
the technological exchange market and the innovation market. The first is the degree of 
substitutability and/or complementarity of patents in the pool, and the second is whether patent 
pools should authorise patent holders to grant individual licences independently from the joint offer 
of the pool. 
                                                          
38
 “The patent pool dedicated to the MPEG-2 video compression standard is a good illustration of the 
efficiencies achieved by joint licensing. Owners of patents reading on MPEG-2 delegate to a jointly owned 
enterprise, MPEG LA, the task of licensing their patents as a single package. The pool was created in 1997 by 8  
organizations holding some 100 patents representing 60 % of the patents reading on the MPEG-2 standard. The 
pool has since expanded rapidly. In 2004 it was comprised of 650 patents owned by 25 organizations, 
accounting for more than 90 % of the patents surrounding the standard. The MPEG-2 patent pool offers “one-
stop shopping” to users of the standard. It thereby saves search and negotiation costs for would-be licenses.” 
(Lévêque and Menière, 2007) 
39
 Delcamp (2010), using data on 1564 essential US patents belonging to 8 different pools and a control 
database with patents having the same characteristics, shows that patents included in a pool are more litigated 
than non-pool patents presenting the same characteristics ( patent holder being the plaintiff in the litigation). 
40
 We do not examine in this article the questions of formation and stability of patent pools. See Aoki and 
Nagaoka (2004), Brenner (2009) and Lévêque and Menière (2011). Similarly, we do not discuss the empirical 
literature on patent pools. See Lerner, Strojwas and Tirole (2007), Lampe and Moser (2010, 2011), Layne-Farrar 
and Lerner (2011), Baron and Delcamp (2010), Baron and Pohlman (2011), Delcamp (2011). 
41
  By contrast, as underlined by Lerner and Tirole (2008), before 1995, there were almost no provisions relative 
to the inclusion of essential patents in the pools. 
42
  Lerner and Tirole (2008, p. 167) underline that, “grant-back provisions force members of the pool to turn to 
the pool for free at a low price future patents that will be deemed essential to the working of the pool .” The 
reader will find in that article a discussion on the introduction of grant-back provisions in the functioning rules 
of a pool both from the point of view of pool members and society at large. 
43
 For more details, see, for example, Lerner and Tirole (2008, p. 161). 
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(i) Complementary vs. Substitute Patents 
 
To find out if patent pools have pro- or anti-competitive effects, we must first know if patent pools 
should include only complementary patents, or if substitutable patents should be allowed as well.44 A 
well-known result is that patent pools increase welfare when included patents are perfect 
complements, but reduce welfare when they are perfect substitutes (Shapiro, 2001; Gilbert, 2004; 
Lerner and Tirole, 2004; Lerner et al., 2007). The argument is simple: a patent pool formed by 
patents that are perfect substitutes (i.e. distinct patents that fulfil the same functionality) is 
analogous to a cartel on the product market, because its goal is to eliminate competition on royalties 
between patent holders.45 In the absence of the patent pool, the situation would be analogous to 
Bertrand competition with license prices tending to marginal cost. The argument according to which 
a pool of substitutable patents can reduce transaction costs is also invalid, because users need a 
license only when patents are substitutable.46 Conversely, when patents are perfect complements, 
royalties are reduced because the pool participants internalize the effect of their pricing on the 
demand for complementary patents. As a result, a patent pool increases both profit and user 
welfare: "a pool eliminates royalty stacking and benefits both patent holders and technology users" 
(Lerner and Tirole, 2008, p. 162). Two cases should nevertheless be distinguished: a licensor vertically 
integrated in the industry in which the license is used (insider), and a licensor not active in that 
industry (outsider).47 
 
Furthermore, it can be difficult for competition authorities to evaluate whether patents are 
complements or substitutes, because patents included in a pool are generally not pure complements 
or pure substitutes. This distinction makes sense only in a dynamic perspective: patents covering a 
given technology are complements when the price for licences is low and substitutes when the price 
is high. Moreover, two patents can be complements for a given functionality at a point in time, but 
be substitutes for a different functionality at another time. Lerner and Tirole (2004) analyse the 
positive and negative effects on welfare of pools composed of patents that are not perfect 
complements or substitutes. The four main results are:48 (i) pools with patents that are close 
complements have a higher probability of increasing welfare; (ii) including in a pool a patent that has 
                                                          
44
 The traditional definition of substitutability (respectively, complementarity) is that two goods are substitutes 
(complements) if increasing the price of one good raises (lowers) the demand for the other. 
45
 In March 1998 the FTC challenged a pool created by Summit Technology, Inc and Visx, Inc, on the ground that 
it was anticompetitive. The pool contained patents related to two different types of laser used for eye surgery, 
and removed price competition between the two products.  As the FTC stated: “Instead of competing with each 
other, the firms placed their competing patents in a patent pool and share the proceeds each and every time a 
Summit or VISX laser is used” (Lévêque and Menière, 2007). 
46
 However, Kato (2004) shows that, under certain conditions, patent pools composed of substitutable patents 
may also enhance consumer welfare. 
47
 Kim (2004) shows that vertical integration always lowers the price of the final good if there is a pool and all 
patents are complements. In other words, the economic efficiency argument for patent pools is enhanced 
when some firms are vertically integrated. Lévêque and Menière (2007) also emphasizes this point: “The entry 
of pure patent holders has complicated the setting of cumulative royalties within patent pools … Pure patent 
owners derive their revenue solely from licensing. Hence their interest is to leverage the market power of the 
pool in order to set a high royalty. The interests of integrated manufacturers are different because of their 
presence on downstream product market […] On the one hand they are licensors who derive more  revenue from 
a high royalty. On the other hand, they are licensees who must pay royalties (e.g., the share of the package 
royalty that is distributed to the other patent owners) for their manufacturing activity. Because of this second 
effect, integrated patent owners are more reluctant than non-integrated patent owners to charge high 
cumulative royalties for the package of patents.” 
48
 Note that Lerner and Tirole’s model (2004) makes several assumptions, some of which are strong. They are: 
(i) user preferences are separable; (ii) pools cannot be formed with a subset of the relevant patents; (iii) only 
polar cases of closed pool and pure third-party licensing by the pool are dealt with. 
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close substitutes outside the pool can reduce collective welfare, unless the patent pool allows its 
members to grant individual licenses (see the next section); (iii) the incentives for patent holders to 
invent around or try invalidate patents held by other members are dulled by the formation of a 
patent pool; (iv) pools reduce the differentiation of downstream users when the latter are also 
licensors. 
 
(ii) Collective Licences and/or Individual Licences 
 
The pro- and anti-competitive effects of patent pools also depend on the possibility for individual 
owners to grant individual licenses independently of the patent pool's collective license. In the case 
of perfect substitutes, independent licenses would allow the re-establishment of a form of 
competition and to limit the monopoly power of the patent pool. However, why would the patent 
pool be allowed in the first place? In the case of perfect complements, independent licenses make no 
sense. The intuition is the following: independent licences can function if users of a technology can 
be satisfied with the purchase of a small number of individual licences instead of buying the whole 
set of licences as a bundle from the patent pool. However, in this case, the problem of royalty 
stacking would reappear: the price paid by the users would be superior to the pool’s profit-
maximising price. The immediate consequence of this royalty stacking is that the patent pool is not 
affected by the possibility that its members grant individual licenses (Lerner and Tirole, 2008). We 
thus understand that the issue of independent licenses makes sense only in cases in which patents 
are neither perfects complements nor perfect substitutes. The possibility for the licensor to license 
its intellectual property rights independently of the patent pool introduces a potential competition 
for the pool’s offer, especially if the latter offers a bundle of licenses that contains more licenses than 
what the users of a given technology need. In this case, the users will prefer buying a smaller bundle 
at a lower price. Independent licenses can thus discourage the formation of patent pools even when 
these pools would actually increase social welfare. Inversely, the possibility for patent holders to 
grant independent licenses does not always constitute a sufficient constraint for pools that eliminate 
competition. 
 
Lerner and Tirole (2004, 2008a) find the following results: “Independent licensing perfectly screens 
out good pools and bad pools : (i) independent licensing is an irrelevant covenant when the pool aims 
at lowering the overall price of the technology below the price that prevails in the absence of pooling 
arrangements (royalty stacking); (ii) Independent licensing restores competition and re-establishes 
the price of the technology at the pre-pool level when the pool aims at raising the price of the 
technology (suppression of competition)… Overall, while the conclusion that independent licensing 
always screens in good pools and screens out bad ones must be qualified, the case in favor of pools 
with independent licensing remains quite strong, even from an ex post perspective, in our current 
state of knowledge” (Lerner and Tirole, 2008a, p. 166-67).49 
 
IV.2.2 Essential Patents and Technology Standards 
 
Whether technological standards are always beneficial for society or can lead to welfare losses is a 
two-sided question. On one hand, the social welfare provided by a technological standard is positive 
when the demand for final products that use the standard is characterized by strong network 
                                                          
49
 Brenner (2009), using a setup close to Lerner and Tirole (2004), addresses the issue of optimal patent pool 
formation when pools may be either pro- or anticompetitive, which ultimately depends on the degree of 
complementarity among patents. He shows that exclusive pool membership (a situation where a firm is 
allowed to participate in the start-up of a pool only if all other pool initiators agree) must be added to licensing 
rules for a pool to be welfare enhancing. Assuming that complementary patents may be either essential or 
nonessential, Quint (2012) finds that a pool containing only nonessential patents can reduce social welfare, 
even if the pool is stable to compulsory individual licensing. 
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externalities and when the standard offers compatibility between the different products that satisfy 
the same technological norm. For example, cellular telephony would be riddled with problems if 
mobile phones from different makers were not mutually compatible. On the other hand, the creation 
of a technological standard necessitates strong cooperation between involved agents, both to obtain 
an agreement that will become the standard and to define conditions of its usage, notably for the 
license rules of essential patents included in the standard. This cooperation obviously entails a risk of 
collusion that can be harmful for society. To know which of these two sides finally prevail is a difficult 
question, and that is the reason why competition authorities, notably the Department of Justice 
(DoJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the United States, recommend an analysis based on 
the rule of reason and not on the application of rules per se.50 
 
We start by illustrating the importance of technological standards de jure stimulated by associations 
of producers and users, known under the label Standard Setting Organizations (SSO). Chiao et al. 
(2007) have identified 59 SSOs operating in the information technology and telecommunications 
sectors. As underlined by Schmalensee (2009), “as of 2001, the IEEE-SA (Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers Standards Association) alone had 866 active standards and 526 projects in 
hand, with more than 450 technical working groups and committees.” SSOs that wish to introduce a 
new standard must achieve a Standard Setting Agreement (SSA). The existence of SSOs can obviously 
create problems from the viewpoint of competition policy. Some SSOs can fall under Article 101(1) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE), in the sense that they may be 
considered as constituting a horizontal agreement between competitors, which is prohibited per se 
by Article 101(1).51 An SSO can indeed distort competition in two ways: upstream between patent 
owners when they allow the selection of a single technology to the detriment of alternative 
solutions, and downstream between the users of the standard if the terms of the contract lead to 
licence conditions that are excessive or discriminatory. An SSA can also fall under Article 102 of the 
TFUE when the amount of royalties required after the standard is adopted is found excessive. Indeed, 
this situation can be considered as an abuse of a dominant position.52 
 
                                                          
50
 See US DoJ and FTC, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights, Promoting Innovation and 
Competition, 2007, Ch. 2. 
51
   The European Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal co-operation 
agreements recognizes the potential beneficial impact of standard setting agreements on technological 
progress but warns about the potential for restrictions, too: “ Standardization agreements usually produce 
significant positive economic effects, for example by promoting economic interpenetration on the internal 
market and encouraging the development of new and improved products or markets and improved supply 
conditions. Standards thus normally increase competition and lower output and sales costs, benefiting 
economies as a whole. Standards may maintain and enhance quality, provide information and ensure 
interoperability and compatibility thus increasing value of the consumer (263). Standard-setting can, however, 
in specific circumstances, also give rise to restrictive effects on competition by potentially restricting price 
competition and limiting or controlling production, markets, innovation or technical development. This can 
occur through three channels, namely reduction in price competition, foreclosure of innovative technologies and 
exclusion of, or discrimination against, certain companies by prevention of effective access to the standard  
(264)”. Note that “a SSA may be exempted from article 101(1) TFEU by article 101(3), which exempts horizontal 
agreements contributing to technological progress … In order to assess whether a standard setting agreement 
may be exempted from Article 101(1), one needs to establish whether an actual standard setting agreement (a) 
contributes to technological or economic progress, (b) while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit, (c) without imposing restrictions which are not indispensable for the attainment of the efficiencies, (d) 
without eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question” (Stryszowska 
2010). 
52
 The Rambus and Qualcomm cases illustrate the difficulties in proving a violation of Article 102 of the TFUE. 
The interested reader will find in Lévêque and Menière (2009) references for the numerous commentaries on 
these two cases. 
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Another issue highlighted by Farrell et al. (2007, p. 607) is that “ex ante, before an industry standard 
is chosen, there are various attractive technologies, but ex post, after industry participants choose a 
standard and take steps to implement it, alternative technologies become less attractive. Thus a 
patent covering a standard may confer market power ex post that was much weaker ex ante.”53 The 
alternative technological solutions can even be forced to leave the market. Once a standard has been 
adopted, it is indeed almost impossible to replace a technological solution for another, given the 
costs that users would need to incur. This situation leads to a hold-up problem: “the risk of hold-up 
comes from the nature of investments that manufacturers of standard-compliant equipment have to 
undertake for testing, designating and producing. Usually, these investments are very specific to the 
chosen standard. As a result, they cannot be easily redeployed to other uses… Because of this lock-in 
effect, manufacturers are ready to pay a much higher royalty after the standard is adopted than 
before” (Lévêque and Menière, 2009). 
 
In fact, most SSOs adopted rules that allow the mitigation of the hold-up risk associated with the 
creation of a standard: “these rules cluster in three areas: disclosure rules, requiring certain 
disclosures of patents or patent applications; negotiation rules, regarding the timing and locus of 
license negotiations; and licensing rules, governing the level and structure of royalties, most often 
requiring participants to license essential patents on “Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory” 
(FRAND) or “Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory” (RAND) terms” (Farrell et al., 2007, p. 609).54 
 
The delimitation of so-called essential patents leads to decisions that are crucial in the ulterior 
development of the standard. However, despite the pretention that this delimitation is the result of 
technical expertise, it is still susceptible to two sources of bias. The first bias is due to the contents of 
the list of patents declared essential. Firms participating in the establishment of the standard are 
encouraged to identify all the patents that they consider as necessary for the usage of the standard. 
That list can be considerably longer than the list constituted by external experts. The first bias is thus 
an excess of essential patents.55 The second source of bias has an effect opposite to the first. For 
strategic reasons, an enterprise can choose not to list one or many of its patents at the time of the 
establishment of the standard, only to use them at a later date to sue users of the standard.56 The 
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 Interoperability is another problem in this situation. The development of a given standard can stimulate the 
development of another technology compatible with the new standard but incompatible with the alternative 
technology that was not chosen by the standard. As highlighted by Stryszowska (2010), “for example, an 
introduction of a standard for a given type of microprocessor may yield a risk of the incompatibility between 
newly developed memory cards and an alternative microprocessor. In that case, an alternative type of 
microprocessor may have little chances to survive.” 
54
 Moreover, Farrell et al. (2007, p. 624) specify that “the disclosure rules seek to eliminate pure hold-up and 
allow SSO members to judge for themselves whether other protections will adequately limit hold-up in a 
particular case; negotiation rules could help make negotiations better reflect ex ante competition, but 
overblown concerns about collective negotiation weaken this approach; and licensing rules are best seen as an 
impressive but binding default ex ante contract.” 
55
 To illustrate, Goodman and Myers (2005) examined the patents declared essential for 3G cellular technology 
and made two conclusions: (i) 75 per cent of patents (nearly 8000) that are declared essential for that standard 
are owned by four companies; (ii) only 21% of patents that are declared essential are truly essential, according 
to experts in that field including the authors of that paper. 
56
 This strategy of ambush or hold-up is described by the OECD as follows: “The implementation of an ambush 
strategy by means of patents pending consists of a firm not informing the standard organisation that she 
applied for patents in relation to the norm being established. At the same time, the firm also modifies the claims 
in these applications so that they correspond to the future standard. The firm can also have an influence on the 
standard, so that it is closer to the claims in her patent applications. The enterprise can thus modify both the 
standard and its own claims in pending applications so that they coincide as much as possible. If everything 
goes according to plan, the standard organisation publishes a norm that is covered by the undisclosed patents 
pending, while the enterprise carries on with the application procedures, from the examination to the granting 
of the patent. Meanwhile, other enterprises apply the standard to their own products. Important irrecoverable 
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timing of this ambush strategy, which is often based on patents pending, is crucial, as highlighted by 
an OECD (2009) report: “If the enterprise had revealed the existence of its patents pending during the 
standard’s elaboration negotiations, the standard organisation could have chosen a different, less 
costly technology (if possible) or could have tried to convince the firm to limit the amount of her 
royalties. However, keeping her patents secret until the norm is applied widely enough to prevent the 
establishment and application of another standard allows the firm to acquire a dominant position 
that she would have not acquired in other circumstances.” 
 
Following this reasoning to the letter, we could be tempted to conclude that, in the measure that the 
obtainment of the dominant position is through abusive behaviour, antitrust authorities have the 
means to stop ambushes in technological standards organisations.57 This task is difficult for two 
reasons.58 The first is that antitrust authorities cannot force members of standards organisations to 
disclose their patents and patents pending that are related to the norm in consideration. The 
incentives to do so depend essentially on the internal functioning rules of the standards 
organisations. The second reason is that antitrust authorities cannot force the organisations’ 
members to announce the maximal price of licenses and the restrictive conditions they would 
impose for the use of their patents. Also, the authorities do not have the power to prescribe the 
conditions of sale of licenses. These requirements are borne more of an eventual public regulation of 
the market for licenses than from the application of competition law. In general, standards 
organisations themselves set the contracting rules in these matters. 
 
A vast literature was developed to define reasonable license prices.59 The simplest solution to the 
hold-up problem is to have royalties fixed before the adoption of the standard. However, this 
solution is difficult to implement in practice. Indeed, patent holders do not know the whole potential 
of the technology before the standard is developed, and thus are incapable of estimating the profits 
that they could enjoy from their licenses. Moreover, even in the case of royalties that are a 
percentage of the sale price, the price-elasticity of the product on the downstream market can be 
poorly estimated. A possible solution would be for the patent owners to commit ex ante not to 
demand excessive royalties ex post that result from the foreclosure of alternative technologies. 
 
Some SSOs thus tried to resolve the hold-up problem by asking their members to commit to having 
license conditions in which ex post royalties are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND), 
although without specifying the exact amount ex ante. A violation of these terms can be subject to 
legal proceedings.60 FRAND terms are obviously subject to interpretation. They can be interpreted as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
investments are made on the basis of the norm. When the ambushing enterprise is certain that the sunk costs 
incurred by other firms are large enough to discourage the transition to another norm, she reveals the existence 
of her patents and attacks, threatening with actions to be compensated for damages. She can decide to ask for 
large royalties or to simply block the application of the technology in question” (OECD, 2009, translated from 
French). This example illustrates once again the strategic role of patents pending. This strategy was used in 
recent cases, including Rambus and Qualcomm. 
57
 However, note that there is a difference between Europe and the United States. In Europe, abuse of a 
dominant position is punished by Article 102 of the TFEU. This article is not focused solely on dominant 
positions acquired through abusive behaviour. Because the acquisition or the attempt to acquire a dominant 
position by anticompetitive manners is not in the scope of Article 102, antitrust laws of the European Treaty do 
not allow the resort to corrective measures to combat ambush strategies in standards organisations. On the 
contrary, in the United States, the acquisition of a monopoly through misleading, as is the case in the standards 
context, is under the scope of competition law. 
58
 See Anton and Yao (1995), Froeb and Ganglmair (2009) 
59
 See among others: Farrell et al. (2007), Lévêque and Menière (2009), and Gilbert (2011). 
60
 Given that the notion of a fair and reasonable price is imprecise, it is not surprising that multiple 
controversies emerged on the subject. Therefore, the predictability of the royalties is limited both for the 
licensee and the licensor. In case of litigation, courts will not be able to assess if the amount of the royalty is 
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the license amount that would have been negotiated ex ante if the economic value of the standard 
was known. This interpretation supposes that the marginal contribution of each patent used in the 
standard can be estimated. It is obvious that royalties will be low for patents that are no-essential or 
replaceable and subject to ex ante competition, whereas royalties will be higher for patents that are 
essential and non-replaceable. FRAND terms are interesting precisely for replaceable patents to 
avoid rent extraction ex post, when competition has been eliminated. One proposition that is often 
made is to cap the amount of royalties asked by a patent holder at the incremental value of the 
patent to the standard (Dolmans et al., 2007; Farrell et al., 2007).  "This rule considers that a licence 
should be established according to the ex-ante incremental contribution value of the chosen 
technology as compared to the next best alternative, measured at the stage in which other substitute 
technologies were available" (Layne-Farrar, Llobet and Padilla, 2012). Swanson and Baumol (2005) 
propose a solution to make this proposition operational: that enterprises wishing to have their 
technology included in a standard accept to participate in an ex ante auction by offering a royalty 
rate. The technology of the enterprise offering the lowest-royalty will be integrated in the standard. 
As highlighted by the authors of that proposition, "the 'best' IP option will be able to command a 
license fee equal to incremental cost plus the difference in value between the best and the next-best 
alternatives" (p. 23).61 Ganglmair et al. (2011) propose an alternative solution in which innovators 
commit ex ante to offer an option-to-license that producers can exercise if they want to include their 
IP in the final product. This solution is superior to the FRAND licensing system.  
 
In this respect, the work of Layne-Farrar, Llobet and Padilla (2012) is particularly interesting. These 
authors start by relaxing two assumptions made implicitly in the literature to justify the incremental 
value rule. They challenge (i) the idea that all R&D is completed at the moment of the adoption of 
the standard and that the innovations were available to be used in the standard, and (ii) that 
enterprises holding patents all choose to join an SSO. The authors show that if patent holders have 
the choice (and not the obligation) to join an SSO, then they generally prefer to stay out of the SSO 
even if the latter imposes an incremental value rule.62 The intuition is the following: the best strategy 
for patent holders is to stay out of the SSO and hope that the substitutable technology chosen by the 
default is non-functioning.63 This strategy would allow these outsiders to find themselves in a 
position of strength ex post and to ask for higher royalties. The authors also find that "in order to 
ensure the patent holder's participation, SSO members are able to and will be interested in increasing 
the licensing fees paid to the patent holder above the dictated level by the incremental value." More 
precisely, these results depend on the degree of complexity of the standards. In the case of simple 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
fair and reasonable. Propositions were made to better define these notions, notably by using elements of 
cooperative game theory. However, these definitions still face technical and legal objections, which make their 
application controversial. The only approach that could prevent abusive behaviour would be an ex ante 
negotiation between holders of essential patents and a user of the standard, the latter acting as a 
counterbalance to the seller’s bargaining power. However, as mentioned above, the multiplicity of involved 
patents makes it difficult to hold prior negotiations between a user and all the owners of patents that are 
necessary to the user. Moreover, because members of the organisation are themselves potential users of the 
norm, an ex ante negotiation for the conditions of sale of the licences could be interpreted as a concerted 
practice, revealing collusion between the members of the organisation. The consequence of these difficulties is 
that antitrust authorities prefer adopting a flexible interpretation of competition law towards standards 
organisations by encouraging them to adopt rules that limit the recourse to ambush strategies. When they 
intervene directly in cases of abuse leading to dominant positions, antitrust authorities use the rule of reason, 
and not prohibition per se. 
61
 Incremental cost is defined as the cost per unit that patent holders incur as a consequence of licensing their 
patent. 
62
 Note that this result is not specific to incremental licensing rule and arises for other licensing rules like the 
benchmark licensing proposed by Lemley and Shapiro (2007). 
63
 The authors assume "that the patented technology is superior to the default one but the standard might still 
be viable if patent holders do not participate, and the SSO needs to rely on the default technology." 
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standards formed of a small number of complementary components, R&D efforts of participating 
enterprises are complementary, thus if an enterprise chooses to join an SSO, its participation will 
provoke an increase in the R&D of other firms. This chain of events increases the standard's 
probability of success and thus the probability to see patent holders participate in the standard 
despite the licensing cap introduced by the incremental value rule. However, this participation is less 
important in the case of complex standards, because complementarities are dispersed over a greater 
number of firms. Finally, the authors conclude that "the overall picture indicates that licensing caps 
like the incremental value rule tend to reduce the incentives for firms to participate in cooperative 
standards setting since most standards can be qualified as complex." 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have showed that the contemporary tensions between intellectual property and 
competition, other than the classical trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency, originate in the 
evolution of the patent system. Some characteristics of this system indeed lead to distortions in 
competition that cannot be corrected by a simple application of antitrust laws. Three of these 
characteristics were examined in details. 
 
1. Many patents of dubious validity are approved by patent offices. 
Patents represent the sacrifice that society is willing to make to benefit from the introduction of a 
new product or production process. This sacrifice is manifested by a temporary exclusion power 
granted to the patent holder. For this sacrifice to make sense, patentability criteria must be fully 
satisfied, and the scope of the claims protected by the patent must not be excessive. However, for a 
variety of reasons examined in this chapter, many patents granted by patent offices do not satisfy 
these criteria, even when they cover products of great social value. Consequently, competition on 
the products market is affected: the temporary exclusion power is no longer justified even if holders 
of dubious patents try to rely on it. It is not the role of competition authorities to verify if practices of 
patent holders rely on dubious patents or not. However, the increased uncertainty on the quality of 
existing patents implies that the social costs of patents are increasing. This cost is measured in two 
ways: either by the legal cost of conflict resolution if the litigation is taken to court, or by the social 
cost induced by a settlement that can be still lead to a welfare loss for consumers. The efficiency of 
the patent attribution system is a necessary and essential prior for competition law to prevent an 
abusive usage of the patent, in other words a usage that goes over the legal privileges attached to 
the title. 
 
2. The usage of patents in sequential innovations enables the hold-up behaviour that affects 
competition on technological markets. 
Beyond the simple intellectual protection against the risk of copying, patents increasingly fulfil an 
essential role on technological markets as a medium of exchange. Consequently, the protection of an 
innovation against imitation is often accompanied by a potential blocking power against ulterior 
innovations that require the use of patented technologies. This blocking power is particularly 
detrimental, because it is often exercised ex post, after the second innovator made the investments 
necessary to his activity. Technological exchanges can thus be constrained in multiple ways, following 
a licensing rejection, an excessive usage fee, the usage of a patent pending, or the injunction power 
that the patent holder can use to stop the activity of the potential infringer. The powers of 
competition authorities seem limited when dealing with excessive protection, and the usual 
presumption that a reinforcement of intellectual property always favours innovation is not verified in 
the case of sequential innovation. Reducing the abusive hold-up behaviour of the holder of a dubious 
patent is a task that rests upon courts and regulation agencies, and only in part to competition 
authorities. 
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3. The simultaneous usage of many patented inputs in complex technologies imposes limits to the 
competition for innovation. 
Another issue beyond the sequential conception to innovation is the effects of fragmented 
ownership of intellectual property and the quantity of patents necessary for the production of some 
goods. On one hand, the patent thicket necessary to access the market can be an obstacle for 
competition. The constitution of patent pools with a collective license can sometimes mitigate this 
problem, but does not solve other questions such as the nature of, and interactions between the 
patents constituting the pool, and the degree of autonomy in the granting of licenses. On the other 
hand, the implementation and functioning of a technological standard necessitates close 
collaboration mechanisms between the holders of essential patents. This coordination can cause 
problems in the smooth operation of the innovation market. In particular, the establishment of 
general principles that must be satisfied by the collective licence’s price does not suffice to mitigate 
the risks of individual deviation and hold-up. Many highly-publicized trials illustrate well the 
materiality of opportunistic behaviour in the functioning of a standard. However, it is again difficult 
for competition authorities to prevent these risks or to convict the authors of opportunistic 
behaviour. 
 
To summarize, the argument defended in this chapter is that we have arrived at a new stage of 
tensions between intellectual property and competition. 
 
In the previous stage, the goal was to draw borders between intellectual property law and 
competition law. This task was difficult but feasible. After successive phases, characterized by the 
alternative dominance of one law over the other,64 of which we can observe the traces in the first 
guidelines established by competition authorities and in the court decisions, a general principle 
emerged, consisting of the recognition of the specificity of intellectual property before applying 
antitrust rules. For example, to know whether a restrictive clause in a licence contract violates 
competition law or not, authorities do not judge the restriction on competition per se as if it was 
applied to a standard market activity. Authorities instead compare the level of competition with the 
restrictive clauses in the licence to the hypothetical level of competition that would prevail if the 
license did not exist. If it is estimated that competition would be stronger in the absence of the 
license, the restrictive clauses are judged as violating competition law. However, if competition 
would not be stronger without the license, the restrictive clause is not judged as anti-competitive by 
antitrust authorities. In cases at the border of competition and intellectual property, the application 
of the reason rule thus progressively replaced per se rules. 
 
In the current stage, the origin of the conflict between patents and competition seem to be of a 
different nature. The conflict resides in the fact that patents are of uncertain quality, and that there 
are close links between fragmented intellectual property rights. The granting of patents, and the 
wars that sometimes accompany these decisions, are becoming decisive episodes in the battles 
between producers operating with complex technologies. To illustrate, we can take a recent example 
of a transaction involving many patents. Microsoft decided to sell to Facebook more than 800 
patents related to advertising, research, on-line commerce, and mobile telephony for over one billion 
dollars, not long after Microsoft had bought these patents from AOL for 550 million dollars (L’Usine 
Nouvelle – Reuters, April 24, 2012). How can we analyse this type of transaction? Is it a simple 
transfer of immaterial assets, translating the existence of comparative advantages according to 
which Facebook would be better suited than AOL in the exploitation of these patents, while 
                                                          
64
 At the beginning of the 20th century, patent law seemed to dominate competition law, so that clauses 
restricting competition in licence contracts were generally allowed. A reversal happened in the 1960s, when 
competition law started to dominate over patent law. Prohibition criteria were thus applied to some 
competition-restricting clauses, known in the United States as the "9 no-no’s". For a more detailed history of 
the evolution of the relations between intellectual property law and competition law, see Gilbert (2006). 
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Microsoft only plays the role of a lucrative middleman? Or is it instead a reinforcement of the 
economic power of Facebook due to the acquisition of a set of patents that play a considerable role 
in the negotiations between actors in the digital economy? What is the legal validity of these patents, 
and how will eventual legal proceedings concerning some of them will be resolved? These questions 
are complex and illustrate the diversity of the potential conflicts between patents and competition. 
Another illustration is the recent case before a court in San Jose in California, in which Apple sued 
Samsung for infringement of several patents used in mobile phones and tablet computers. Because 
the case was heard before a popular jury that does not necessarily have all the technical knowledge 
pertaining to the case, the arguments of the plaintiff (Apple) as well as the arguments of the 
defendant (Samsung) rested on abstract principles. For the plaintiff, the case was not a war between 
two giants, but simply an opportunity to save the principles and values of intellectual property: 
Samsung allegedly imitated in three months what Apple developed in three years. For Samsung’s 
lawyer, the principle of competition was violated: “Today's verdict should not be viewed as a win for 
Apple, but as a loss for the American consumer. It will lead to fewer choices, less innovation, and 
potentially higher prices. It is unfortunate that patent law can be manipulated to give one company a 
monopoly over rectangles with rounded corners, or technology that is being improved every day by 
Samsung and other companies. Consumers have the right to choices, and they know what they are 
buying when they purchase Samsung products. This is not the final word in this case or in battles 
being waged in courts and tribunals around the world, some of which have already rejected many of 
Apple's claims. Samsung will continue to innovate and offer choices for the consumer.” The Economist 
analysed the conflict between Apple and Samsung and stated that: “If, as it seems, Apple has had to 
resort to the courts to stifle competition and limit consumer choice, then it is a sad day for American 
innovation. That the company can do so with such impunity is an even sadder reflection of how 
dysfunctional the patent system in the United States has become”. This battle of principles is at the 
heart of contemporary tensions between intellectual property and competition. Furthermore, the 
verdict of the American court that Samsung infringed on Apple’s patents was not the same in a 
judgement in front of a Japanese court65. Should we see this difference in the judgements as a sign 
that the United States recognizes the applicability of patents to computer software, while other 
countries have some reservations? As a last word, the evolution of technology invites us to revisit the 
foundations of the patent system to analyse the new relations between competition and intellectual 
property, which we have tried to sketch in this chapter. 
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